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Bob Jonesing: Same-Sex Marriage and the
Hankering to Strip Religious Institutions of
Their Tax-Exempt Status
Timothy J. Tracey*
INTRODUCTION
“It is . . . it is going to be an issue.”1 With those words, the Solicitor
General of the United States, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., announced that
religious liberty is directly threatened by the legalization of same-sex
marriage. General Verrilli represented the Obama Administration at the oral
argument in Obergefell v. Hodges,2 the case concerning whether the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry.
He made the statement in response to a question from Justice Samuel Alito.
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, in the Bob Jones case, the Court held that a
college was not entitled to tax-exempt status if it opposed interracial
marriage or interracial dating. So would the same apply to a university
or a college if it opposed same-sex marriage?
GENERAL VERRILLI: You know, I . . . I don’t think I can answer
that question without knowing more specifics, but it’s certainly going
to be an issue. I . . . I don’t deny that. I don’t deny that, Justice Alito. It
is . . . it is going to be an issue.3
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Associate Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. My thanks to Tricia, Nathan, and Noah
for their love, support, and encouragement. SDG.
1
Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556,
14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
2
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591 (2015).
3
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 38.
4
461 U.S. 574 (1983).
5
Id. at 592–93.
6
See id. at 580, 583.
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In Bob Jones University v. United States,4 the United States Supreme
Court held that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) could revoke the taxexempt status of two private, religious schools—Goldsboro Christian
Schools, Inc. and Bob Jones University—because their admission policies
were “contrary to a fundamental public policy.”5 Goldsboro flatly denied
admission to black students, while Bob Jones admitted black students but
prohibited interracial dating.6 Both schools genuinely believed that the
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Bible prohibited racial intermixing.7
The schools argued that, as religious institutions whose discrimination
was religiously required, they should be exempt from the IRS policy of
conditioning tax-exempt status for educational institutions on compliance
with anti-discrimination norms. The Court rejected the argument that the
denial violated the schools’ free exercise rights. The Court ruled that
eradicating race discrimination was an interest “so compelling as to allow
even regulations prohibiting religiously based conduct.”8 The Court
acknowledged that the “[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have a
substantial impact on the operation of private religious schools,” but “[t]hat
[the] governmental interest [in eliminating discrimination] substantially
outweigh[ed] whatever burden denial of tax benefits place[d] on petitioners’
exercise of their religious beliefs.”9
If opposition to same-sex marriage is also “contrary to a fundamental
public policy,” then what happens to the private, religious schools that
prohibit same-sex dating or deny housing to students in same-sex
relationships? After all, opposition to same-sex marriage, according to the
Obergefell majority, “disparage[s] [same-sex couples’] choices,”10
“diminish[es] their personhood,”11 and “demeans or stigmatizes”12 them.
Surely, that too runs “contrary to fundamental public policy?”13
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy did little to answer that
concern.

True, it is a nod and a smile in the direction of the First Amendment. But it
is little more. The promise that people of faith may “advocate” and “teach”
their beliefs about marriage gives scant assurance that they can in fact act
7
8
9
11
12
13
14

04/28/2016 10:11:02

10

Id. at 602 n.28; see also id. at 604 n.30.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 603–04.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 592–93.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607.
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Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to
religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere
conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be
condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations
and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the
principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths,
and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they
have long revered.14
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on those beliefs. A church can teach that marriage is between one man and
one woman but can the church refuse to perform a same-sex marriage? A
Christian college can advocate for the complementary roles of husbands and
wives in marriage but can they establish rules prohibiting same-sex
relationships? The dissenting Justices harped on this anemic view of
religious liberty posited by the majority. Chief Justice Roberts wrote:
The majority graciously suggests that religious believers may continue
to “advocate” and “teach” their views of marriage. The First
Amendment guarantees, however, the freedom to “exercise” religion.
Ominously, that is not a word the majority uses.
Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in ways
that may be seen to conflict with the new to same-sex marriage—
when, for example, a religious college provides married student
housing only to opposite-sex married couples, or a religious adoption
agency declines to place children with same-sex married couples . . .
Unfortunately, people of faith can take no comfort in the treatment
they receive from the majority today.15
Justice Thomas expressed similar concerns:
In our society, marriage is not simply a governmental institution; it is a
religious institution as well. Today’s decision might change the
former, but it cannot change the latter. It appears all but inevitable that
the two will come into conflict, particularly as individuals and
churches are confronted with demands to participate in and endorse
civil marriages between same-sex couples.

15

C M
Y K

Id. at 2625–26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

04/28/2016 10:11:02

Although our Constitution provides some protection against such
governmental restrictions on religious practices, the People have long
elected to afford broader protections than this Court’s constitutional
precedents mandate. Had the majority allowed the definition of
marriage to be left to the political process—as the Constitution
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The majority appears unmoved by that inevitability. It makes only a
weak gesture toward religious liberty in a single paragraph. And even
that gesture indicates a misunderstanding of religious liberty in our
Nation’s tradition. Religious liberty is about more than just the
protection for “religious organizations and persons . . . as they seek to
teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives
and faiths.” Religious liberty is about freedom of action in matters of
religion generally, and the scope of that liberty is directly correlated to
the civil restraints placed upon religious practice.
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requires—the People could have considered the religious liberty
implications of deviating from the traditional definition as part of their
deliberative process. Instead, the majority’s decision short-circuits that
process, with potentially ruinous consequences for religious liberty.16
Justice Alito said similarly:
Perhaps recognizing how its reasoning may be used, the majority
attempts, toward the end of its opinion, to reassure those who oppose
same-sex marriage that their rights of conscience will be protected. We
will soon see whether this proves to be true. I assume that those who
cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the
recesses of their homes, but if they repeat those views in public, they
will risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments,
employers, and schools.17

When tax exemptions are removed, donors will give far less than they
are giving now. Churches will become liable to property taxes. That
means that many churches will have to forfeit their property to the
government because they won’t be able to afford the taxes they have to
pay on it. Many of them wouldn’t be able to pay them now. If
donations went down, they would be that much further from being able
to pay them. As a result, churches that reside on valuable properties in
16

C M
Y K
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Id. at 2638–39 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2642–43 (Alito, J., dissenting).
18
Mark Oppenheimer, Now’s the Time to End Tax Exemptions for Religious Institutions, TIME
(June 28, 2015), http://time.com/3939143/nows-the-time-to-end-tax-exemptions-for-religious-institu
tions.
19
Id.
20
Id.
17
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As if on cue, only two days after the Court handed down Obergefell,
Mark Oppenheimer, a news columnist, took to the Time magazine blog to
call for the IRS to strip religious organizations of their tax-exempt status.
Invoking Bob Jones, he said, “It’s time to abolish, or greatly diminish, their
tax-exempt statuses.” He concluded, “So yes, the logic of gay-marriage
rights could lead to a reexamination of conservative churches’ tax
exemptions . . . . But when that day comes, it will be long overdue.”18
Oppenheimer knows the consequences of shucking religious
organizations of their tax-exempt status would be disastrous. He conceded
that “charitable giving would drop,” and that “churches would be squeezed
out of high-property-value areas.”19 And the poor be damned—”we’d have
fewer church soup kitchens.”20 Professor Denny Burk gave the grisly
details:
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urban locations would be immediately vulnerable. Eventually, so
would everyone else. A call for ending tax exemptions for religious
institutions is a call to close them down . . . .21

21
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Y K
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Denny Burk, Ending Tax Exemptions Means Ending Churches, THE FEDERALIST (June 29,
2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/06/29/ending-tax-exemptions-means-ending-churches.
22
Oppenheimer, supra note 18.
23
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24
See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental
Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (arguing that the Establishment Clause is “properly understood as a
structural restraint on governmental power” and “its task is to negate from the purview of civil
governance all matters ‘respecting an establishment of religion’”).
25
Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” for Religious Institutions Constitutionally Dependent
on Benefits for Secular Entities?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 805, 807 (2001).
26
Id.
27
17 U.S. 316 (1819).
28
Id. at 431.
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Oppenheimer is confused. He misunderstands the nature of tax
exemptions for religious organizations. Throughout his blog post, he called
for the government to stop “subsidizing” religion.22 But when the federal
government exempts religious groups from paying federal income tax, it is
not choosing to bankroll religion. Rather, the government is recognizing
that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment mandates a
separation of church and state. The Clause acts as a restraint on the federal
government’s power over matters “respecting an establishment of
religion.”23 It places these matters outside the purview of government
power.24 The government refrains from taxation of religious organizations
“to accommodate the autonomy of religious actors and activities.”25 Tax
exemption, said Professor Edward Zelinsky, is an “acknowledgement of
sectarian sovereignty, . . . rather than the subsidization of religion.” “In the
final analysis, tax exemption,” observed Zelinsky, “does not subsidize
churches, but leaves them alone.”26
Every law student knows the one-liner from McCulloch v. Maryland27:
“the power to tax involves the power to destroy.”28 The U.S. Supreme Court
held in McCulloch that the principle of federalism—the structural restraint
imposed by the Constitution on the federal government’s power over the
states and, vice-versa, the states’ power over the federal government—
prevented the State of Maryland from taxing the federal bank. Were it
otherwise, the Court said, the state could tax the federal bank out of
existence. That would invert the structure of the Constitution, which makes
the federal government supreme over the states. Federalism—the very
structure of government enshrined in the Constitution—placed the power to
tax the instruments of the federal government outside the purview of the
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See id. at 428–35.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
31
See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption,
23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998) (conceptualizing exemption under Section 501(c)(3) as premised on the
notion that charitable entities are “co-sovereigns” with the state).
32
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 2,
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2015).
33
See id. at 3.
34
Internal Revenue Service, Field Service Advice Memorandum, 1997 FSA LEXIS 478, at *11
(Apr. 23, 1997).
35
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–04 (1983).
36
Olati Johnson, The Story of Bob Jones University v. United States: Race, Religion, and
Congress’ Extraordinary Acquiescence 29 (Colum. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper No.
9184, 2010), http://lsr.nellco.org/columbia_pllt/9184.
30
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states.29
In the same way, the Establishment Clause places outside the purview
of the federal government matters “respecting an establishment of
religion,”30 including the power to tax religious organizations. Just as
federalism recognizes the federal government and the states as distinct
sovereigns with separate spheres of power, the Establishment Clause
recognizes the church and the civil government as separate and distinct
sovereigns.31 Neither can encroach on the territory of the other. Were the
federal government permitted to tax religious organizations, it could snuff
religion out.
The IRS’s own regulations recognize this limitation. Churches “are
automatically considered tax exempt and are not required to apply for and
obtain recognition of tax-exempt status from the IRS.”32 The Constitution
itself precludes the government from taxing churches. It is automatic. The
reason religious organizations, other than churches, must apply for taxexempt status is to ensure that they are in fact religious. Once that
determination is made, they too are exempt from federal income tax.33 The
IRS is merely recognizing what the Constitution already mandates.
The Bob Jones case represents the lone exception. Eradicating race
discrimination is the only “fundamental public policy” the U.S. Supreme
Court has held overrides the First Amendment mandate of separation of
church and state. The IRS agrees. “Currently the sole basis for revocation of
exemption on public policy grounds,” says the IRS, “is engaging in race
discrimination.”34 The government’s interest in “eradicating racial
discrimination in education” is, according to the Bob Jones court, “so
compelling” as to warrant the breach of the wall of separation.35
Bob Jones, in this regard, is singular. It is a historical anomaly. “[The
case],” said Professor Olatunde Johnson, “is too extraordinary to matter
much.”36 Private, segregated schools had sprung up across the South as a
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way to dodge integrated public education. States were fostering the
expansion of these schools, according to Johnson, by “enacting legislation
mandating or allowing the closing of public schools to resist desegregation
or providing state tax credits and tuition grants to students attending private
schools.”37 Denying tax-exempt status was the only way to curb the growth
of these schools. Moreover, “the position of all three branches of the
Federal Government was unmistakably clear”—racial discrimination in
education “violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary
justice.”38
Bob Jones, thus, sits alongside the myriad of other court decisions
from the civil rights era where the Supreme Court was willing to go to
extraordinary lengths to eradicate race discrimination. Cases, like Norwood
v. Harrison,39 where the Court deviated from the norm to get at the horrible
evil that is race discrimination. In Norwood, the Court held that the racial
discrimination of private schools in Mississippi could be attributed to the
state, because the state provided the schools with free textbooks.40 Yet the
general rule is, even if the state is providing 99 percent of the funding for a
private organization and heavily regulating almost every aspect of its
operation, the private organization is nonetheless not a state actor.41 The
Court was willing to set aside this general rule to go after racism. The Court
did not vitiate the rule. Instead, it found that the extraordinary
circumstances—the long history of slavery, racism, and discrimination
against African-Americans—warranted setting the rule aside in this one
instance.
Professor Michael Paulsen put it this way:

37

C M
Y K
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Id. at 4.
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 592, 598.
39
413 U.S. 455 (1973).
40
Id. at 467 (“[T]he constitutional infirmity of the Mississippi textbook program is that it
significantly aids the organization and continuation of a separate system of private schools which, under
the District Court holding, may discriminate if they so desire.”).
41
See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 832 (1982) (“In recent years, public funds have
accounted for at least 90%, and in one year 99%, of respondent school’s operating budget.”); see also id.
at 840 (“[W]e conclude that the school’s receipt of public funds does not make the discharge decisions
acts of the State.”); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) (“That programs undertaken by the
State result in substantial funding of the activities of a private entity is no more persuasive than the fact
of regulation of such an entity in demonstrating that the State is responsible for decisions made by the
entity in the course of its business.”).
38
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Bob Jones strikes me as sui generis—a just result that seemingly had to
be reached because of our national commitment to racial equality and
our shameful national history of slavery and segregation, but that
ought not to have been reached at such expense to constitutional
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principle—and should be treated as such. It should not be permitted to
generate consequences much beyond the facts of the particular case.42
Hence, Bob Jones cannot be generalized into a rule that the IRS can
deny religious organizations tax-exempt status anytime something smells
mildly of discrimination. Even the panoply of court decisions, legislation,
and public policy pronouncements concerning gender discrimination have
not added up to a “fundamental public policy” sufficient to deny religious
organizations tax-exempt status. Churches and other religious organizations
routinely discriminate on the basis of gender when it comes to ministers,
priests, pastors, and the like. Yet they retain their tax-exempt status.
Prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination similarly cannot be called
a “fundamental public policy” that warrants overriding the constitutional
mandate of separation of church and state. At least not yet. Unlike the
history that gave rise to Bob Jones, thousands of private schools did not
spring up as a means to avoid attending school with gays and lesbians. In
fact, many private schools actively recruit gay men and lesbians.43
Nor have “all three branches of the Federal Government” been
“unmistakably clear” in condemning sexual orientation discrimination.44
Executive orders signed by Presidents Clinton and Obama prohibit sexual
orientation discrimination by the federal government and its contractors.45
But federal law otherwise does not prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination. Congress has repeatedly declined to pass the Employment
42

04/28/2016 10:11:02
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Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum:
Unconstitutional Conditions on “Equal Access” for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 653, 694 (1996).
43
See John Schwartz, Finding a Gay-Friendly Campus, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2010), www.
nytimes.com/2010/04/18/education/edlife/18guidance-t.html?_r=0; Matt Lamb, Penn’s Gaydar Admissions Project Goes Back Years: Gays are “Blue-Chip Recruits”, THE COLLEGE FIX (Nov. 20, 2014),
www.thecollegefix.com/post/20203/; Scott Jaschik, The Same Boxes to Check, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan.
26, 2011), www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/01/26/common_application_rejects_new_questions_on
_sexual_orientation_and_gender_identity; Doree Shafrir, The Ivy League’s Big Gay Admission, DETAILS
(Sept. 23, 2010), www.details.com/culture-trends/news-and-politics/201009/gay-lgbt-sexual-orientationivy-league-admission.
44
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598 (1983).
45
See Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40245 (Aug. 2, 1995) (establishing criteria for the
issuance of security clearances including sexual orientation for the first time in its non-discrimination
language: “The United States Government does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in granting access to classified information.” It also
said that “no inference” about suitability for access to classified information “may be raised solely on
the basis of the sexual orientation of the employee.”); Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30097 (May
28, 1998) (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in the competitive service of the
federal civilian workforce); Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42971 (July 21, 14) (adding “gender
identity” to the categories protected against discrimination in hiring in the federal civilian workforce and
both “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to the categories protected against discrimination in
hiring and employment on the part of federal government contractors and sub-contractors).
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46
See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Employ
ment_Non-Discrimination_Act#113th_Congress (last visited Sept. 9, 2015).
47
See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6 (2013), www.
congress.gov/113/bills/s815/BILLS-113s815rfh.pdf.
48
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–05 (2015).
49
Although not directly relevant under Bob Jones, state law tells much the same story. Twentyone states and the District of Columbia have passed laws prohibiting sexual orientation in employment
in the public and private sectors. All of these laws contain religious exemptions. See JEROME HUNT, A
STATE-BY-STATE EXAMINATION OF NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND POLICIES, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS ACTION FUND 3–4 (2012), www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/report/2012/06/11/11696/
a-state-by-state-examination-of-nondiscrimination-laws-and-policies.
50
See Complainant v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080 (July 16, 2015), www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/sexual_orientation/eeoc-lgbt-title-vii-decision.authch
eckdam.pdf.
51
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598 (1983).
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Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which would ban discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in employment nationwide. ENDA has been
introduced in every Congress since 1994, but has yet to pass both houses.46
The version of ENDA that passed the Senate in November 2013 contained a
broad religious exemption. Referring directly to the religious exemption in
Title VII, it exempted from the prohibition on employment discrimination
based on sexual orientation the same class of religious organizations that
are exempt from the existing prohibition on religious discrimination in
employment.47 The Supreme Court in Obergefell held that the fundamental
right to marry protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right of
same-sex couples to marry. But the Court did not hold that sexual
orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect class.48 Federal law, thus, at least as
it currently sits, provides no basis for concluding that a “fundamental public
policy” of prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination exists.49
That of course could change. In mid-July of 2015, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) interpreted Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act to forbid sexual orientation discrimination on the job
as a form of “sex” discrimination.50 The EEOC’s views on the scope of the
Title VII are merely persuasive, not binding, authority on the courts. But if
the EEOC’s ruling sticks, it will accomplish what Congress could not:
establish a national policy of protecting gay men and lesbians from job
discrimination. Even if that happens, it would still be difficult to argue “all
three branches of the Federal Government” have been “unmistakably
clear”51 in condemning sexual orientation discrimination. Congress will
have remained silent. But it would indicate a clear move toward a national
policy against sexual orientation discrimination. Perhaps four to five years
from now, the calculus under Bob Jones will come out differently.
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This Article argues that the income tax exemptions provided to
religious institutions are constitutionally mandated and that whatever
interest the government has in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination
does not justify setting this mandate aside. Part I defines what is meant by
“tax-exempt status.” Part II shows that the religious exemption from the
federal income tax is constitutionally required. The exemption is compelled
by the structure of the U.S. Constitution, rather than a matter of government
altruism. Part III lays out the extraordinary character of the Bob Jones case
and its limited application beyond the eradication of race discrimination at
educational institutions. Part IV argues that Bob Jones cannot be used to
justify stripping religious institutions of their federal tax-exempt status.
This Article concludes that the religious exemption from the income tax is
about obeying the constitutional command to leave religious institutions
alone and nothing in Bob Jones and Obergefell gives cause to do otherwise.
I. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY “TAX-EXEMPT STATUS”?

• the organization must be organized and operated
exclusively for religious, educational, scientific, or other
52

C M
Y K
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People often confuse the terms “nonprofit” and “tax exempt.” Just because an organization is
a nonprofit corporation does not make it tax exempt. Nonprofit status refers to incorporation status under
state law; tax-exempt status refers to federal income tax exemption under the Internal Revenue Code.
Nonprofit corporations, contrary to what the name suggests, can earn a profit, meaning they can generate
more income than expenses. What they cannot do is distribute these earnings to individuals who control
the organizations. They have no shareholders. Nonprofits exist to benefit the public good, not private
investors. All profits must be reinvested into the nonprofit to further the purposes for which they were
organized. Although many nonprofit corporations are also tax exempt, they are not automatically so.
The nonprofit corporation must meet certain criteria and, generally, apply to the IRS.
53
See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2015).

37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 50 Side B

The Bob Jones court considered only whether the federal government,
vis-à-vis the IRS, could deny private religious schools exemptions from
federal income taxes, not exemptions from the slew of other taxes imposed
on private religious schools, like payroll taxes. That is because the taxexempt designations doled out by the IRS spare a religious school from
paying federal corporate income tax and nothing else. The IRS has no
authority to exempt religious schools from other taxes.
Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code provides a list of 29
nonprofit organizations that are exempt from federal income tax.52 The most
common type of tax-exempt organization falls under the category 501(c)(3),
which exempts organizations established for a variety of charitable
purposes, including religious and educational purposes.53
To qualify for tax-exempt status, an organization must meet the
following requirements:
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charitable purposes,
• net earnings may not inure to the benefit of any private
individual or shareholder,
• no substantial part of its activity may be attempting to
influence legislation,
• the organization may not intervene in political campaigns,
and
• the organization’s purposes and activities may not be illegal
or violate fundamental public policy.54

See id. § 501(c)(3); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES &
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2015), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf.
55
See 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2015).
56
See id. § 501(b).
57
See id. § 170.
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Private religious schools ordinarily satisfy these requirements. They
are organized for religious and educational purposes, two of the permissible
purposes spelled out in Section 501(c)(3). The schools are organized as
nonprofit corporations, meaning they do not distribute earnings to investors
or other private individuals. Rather, they reinvest their earnings into the
school to further their religious and educational missions. The schools
refrain from political activity, either lobbying or campaigning. And their
purposes and activities are not illegal. The open question, of course, is
whether their purposes and activities violate “fundamental public policy.”
But given that eradicating race discrimination in education is, thus far, the
only public policy ground the IRS or the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized as sufficient to deny tax-exempt status, the bulk of private
religious schools seem to be in compliance.
Private schools gain two perks from tax-exempt status. First, the tax
exemption frees them from paying federal corporate income tax on their
earnings.55 The caveat is that the income must be related to their religious
and educational missions. Unrelated business income is still subject to
taxation.56 Consider an example. A private Christian college opens a pizza
parlor on campus to sell pizza to students and non-students alike. The
college is a tax-exempt organization and its pizza parlor generates unrelated
business income. While the tuition and fees generated by the college are tax
exempt, its income from the pizza parlor is not. The pizza parlor is
unrelated to the college’s educational and religious purposes.
Second, tax-exempt status means contributions to private religious
schools are tax deductible.57 Donors may deduct the amount donated to a
private religious school from their taxable income and lower their tax bill.
Obviously, that makes giving to private religious schools, or any other tax-
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exempt charity for that matter, more appealing than it would otherwise be.
But 501(c)(3) status does not give private schools a free ride. The
schools are still on the hook for payroll and withholding taxes,
unemployment taxes, property taxes, state and local income taxes, and sales
tax. Moreover, as explained above, any income unrelated to the religious
and/or educational purpose of the schools remains subject to federal income
tax. Of course, state law could separately exempt religious schools from
state and local taxes. But that is purely a function of state law and not the
tax-exempt designation from the IRS.
II. THE RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTION FROM THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX IS CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED
BY THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
The governing case law, the history, and the underlying policy
considerations, all favor the conclusion that the exemption of religious
organizations from the federal income tax is compelled by the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
A. Is Tax-Exempt Status a Government Subsidy?

Subsidy, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/subsidy (last visited Sept.
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9, 2015).
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Despite the heated rhetoric surrounding Obergefell, whether private
religious schools opposing same-sex marriage may retain their tax-exempt
status largely turns on a prosaic issue: is tax-exempt status of religious
organizations a government subsidy or a constitutionally-mandated
accommodation of religious exercise? If it is a subsidy, then tax exemption
is a matter of government largess. Religious organizations have no right to
an exemption. The government can choose to exempt private religious
schools or not. But if tax-exempt status for religious organizations is
commanded by the constitution, then the federal government has no choice
in the matter. It must exempt religious organizations from federal income
taxes. It cannot override that constitutional command absent the most
extraordinary circumstances.
At first blush, the question seems daft. Of course, tax exemptions are
subsidies. A subsidy is any “pecuniary aid furnished by a government to a
private industrial undertaking, a charity organization, or the like.”58 When
the IRS exempts religious organizations from paying income tax, it
undeniably provides them with “pecuniary aid.” Less tax paid, means more
money in the coffers. Obviously, right?
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59
See Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 540–42 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217, 229, 235 (2000).
60
See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833; Southworth, 519 U.S. at 235.
61
See COURAGE TO CARE, www.ccspeaks.com (last visited Sept. 9 2015).
62 ALCOHOL AND DRUG POLICY, UNIV. OF VA. GRADUATE REC. ch. 4 (1998), www.virginia.edu/
registrar/records/98gradrec/chapter4/gchap4-2.3.html.
63
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541.
64
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
65
Id.

37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 52 Side A

But that oversimplifies the matter. When used by the Supreme Court,
the word “subsidy” is a term of art. The Court is not using the word
according to its plain meaning. Otherwise, any time the government handed
out money to a private entity, it could be dubbed a “subsidy.” Rather, the
Court uses the term to describe those particular instances where the
government furnishes money to private entities to promote the
government’s own policies.59 In these instances, the government may take
steps to ensure that the entities receiving subsidies fulfill the government’s
own policy objectives. And the government has no obligation,
constitutional or otherwise, to subsidize entities that cannot or will not
promote its policies.60
Suppose the University of Virginia (UVA), a public university, gives
money to the organization Courage to Care to have Dr. Carolyn Cornelison
address students about responsible drinking.61 UVA has an “Alcohol and
Drug Policy” that provides, “The University . . . does not condone the
illegal or otherwise irresponsible use of alcohol and other drugs.”62 When
UVA gives money to Courage to Care, it is doing so to promote its own
policy concerning alcohol abuse. UVA is paying Dr. Cornelison to convey
the university’s own message. That money is properly termed a government
subsidy. It is UVA furnishing money to a private entity to further its own
policies.
Because the money is a subsidy, UVA has “latitude . . . for restrictions
on speech.”63 The university “may take legitimate and appropriate steps to
ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee”
without running afoul of the Constitution.64 It can tell Dr. Cornelison that
she must speak about responsible drinking. It can prohibit her from using
the money to stand up and talk about some other topic, like the academic
challenges of getting a PhD, without violating Dr. Cornelison’s free speech
rights. The Court put it this way: “[W]e have permitted the government to
regulate the content of what is or is not expressed . . . when it enlists private
entities to convey its own message.”65
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The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the
public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative
program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so
doing, the Government has . . . merely chosen to fund one activity to
the exclusion of the other. A legislature’s decision not to subsidize the
66
68
69
70
71

Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 (citations and quotations omitted).
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
Id. at 178–81.
See id. at 178.
Id. at 192 (quotations omitted).

04/28/2016 10:11:02
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Moreover, UVA can subsidize speech about responsible drinking
without needing to fund speech promoting the opposite viewpoint—speech
extolling the “virtues” of frat parties. “[V]iewpoint-based funding
decisions,” said the Court, “can be sustained in instances . . . in which the
government used private speakers to transmit specific information
pertaining to its own program.”66 While such viewpoint is ordinarily an
“egregious”67 First Amendment violation, it is perfectly acceptable when
the government is doling out subsidies.
Rust v. Sullivan68 provides an example of a government subsidy
straight from the Court’s jurisprudence. In Rust, the federal government had
a policy of supporting “preventive family planning services, population
research, infertility services, and other related medical, informational, and
educational activities.”69 To further this policy, Congress passed Title X of
the Public Health Services Act to give money to doctors to advise patients
about family planning. Congress did not consider abortion to be within its
family planning objectives, so it forbade doctors receiving money from
discussing abortion with their patients.70 Some doctors receiving Title X
money challenged this restriction as violating their free speech rights.
Specifically, they “contend[ed] that the regulations violate[d] the First
Amendment by impermissibly discriminating based on viewpoint because
they prohibit all discussion about abortion as a lawful option . . . while
compelling the clinic or counselor to provide information that promotes
continuing a pregnancy to term.”71
The Supreme Court ruled that the Title X grants were government
subsidies. Congress gave money to doctors for the purpose of promoting the
government’s own policies about family planning. As such, Congress could
impose restrictions to ensure that the doctors were in fact furthering the
government’s policy objectives, even if that meant engaging in viewpoint
discrimination. The Court said:
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exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right . . . . There
is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected
activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant
with legislative policy.72

72
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Id. at 193.
Id.
74
See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (“Charitable exemptions
are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit—a benefit which the society or
the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the work
of public institutions already supported by tax revenues.”).
73
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The prohibition on abortion counseling was necessary “to ensure that the
limits of the federal program [were] observed.”73
So if tax exemptions for religious organizations are subsidies—true
subsidies in the technical, legal sense—then the IRS has the leeway to
impose restrictions to ensure that the organizations advance the
government’s reasons for handing out the exemptions in the first place.
According to this line of argument, the reason the government provides tax
exemptions to charities, including religious organizations, is a recognition
of the public benefit these organizations provide.74 Religious organizations
that espouse the belief that marriage is only between one man and one
woman cannot be viewed as conferring a public benefit and, therefore, the
IRS can deny them a tax exemption. To exempt such bigoted organizations
would run contrary to the government’s policies undergirding tax
exemptions. Therefore, the government can choose not to exempt them
without raising any concerns under the Constitution. It is like UVA funding
a speech by Dr. Cornelison but not the frat boy. Or Congress funding
doctors promoting childbirth but not doctors promoting abortion. They are
matters of government discretion and policymaking, and not matters of any
constitutional magnitude.
But if the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment—the principle
of separation of church and state—mandates tax exemptions for religious
organizations, then the IRS has no discretion in the matter. The exemptions
are not about a determination of whether particular religious organizations
provide what the government believes is a “public benefit.” Or even a
government decision as to whether specific religious organizations further
the IRS’s policies behind the giving of tax exemptions. Rather, the
government is obeying a constitutional command, in which case, a tax
exemption for religious organizations cannot be denominated a subsidy.
The government is adhering to the very structure of government dictated by
the Constitution, not choosing which organizations best furthers its own
agenda.
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B. The Establishment Clause Forbids the Government from Intruding on
the Autonomy of Religious Organizations
The common understanding of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment—or the separation of church and state—is that it prevents the
government from doing religious “stuff.” The person on the street accepts
that the Establishment Clause means the government cannot set up a
Methodist church, force public school students to worship Vishnu, or send
tax dollars to the local mosque. But what is missing is an understanding of
the flipside of separation of church and state. The Establishment Clause
also means the government cannot monkey around with the autonomy of
religious institutions. The Supreme Court put it this way: “[The
Establishment Clause] radiates . . . a spirit of freedom for religious
organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation, in
short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters
of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”75
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,76 for example, presented the Supreme Court with a dispute
between a Presbyterian denomination, and two of its local congregations
over the control of properties in Georgia. The controversy began when the
local churches sought to leave the denomination and take their property
with them. The churches believed that the denomination’s apparent
abandonment of traditional, orthodox Christian beliefs justified leaving with
their property.77 The lower court held in favor of the local churches, finding
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But it is a very different thing where a subject-matter of dispute, strictly and purely ecclesiastical
in its character,––a matter over which the civil courts exercise no jurisdiction,––a matter which
concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity
of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them,–becomes the subject of
its action. It may be said here, also, that no jurisdiction has been conferred on the tribunal to try the
particular case before it, or that, in its judgment, it exceeds the powers conferred upon it, or that
the laws of the church do not authorize the particular form of proceeding adopted; and, in a sense
often used in the courts, all of those may be said to be questions of jurisdiction. But it is easy to see
that if the civil courts are to inquire into all these matters, the whole subject of the doctrinal
theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization of every
religious denomination may, and must, be examined into with minuteness and care, for they would
become, in almost every case, the criteria by which the validity of the ecclesiastical decree would
be determined in the civil court. This principle would deprive these bodies of the right of
construing their own church laws . . . and would, in effect, transfer to the civil courts where
property rights were concerned the decision of all ecclesiastical questions.
Id. at 733–34.
76 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
77
See id. at 441–43.
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Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116
(1952); see also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871). The Watson Court clearly premised its holding in
terms of lack of jurisdiction or power:
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that the denomination had in fact left behind orthodox beliefs and thereby
given up any right to the contested property.78
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause
precluded the courts from becoming involved in the dispute, since it
necessarily turned on a determination of what constituted orthodox
Christian beliefs. The “American concept of the relationship between
church and state . . . leaves the civil courts no role in determining
ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property disputes.”79 “If
civil courts undertake to resolve [doctrinal] controversies in order to
adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting
the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular
interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern.”80 The separation of
church and state mandated by the Establish-ment Clause prevented the
courts from exercising jurisdiction over the religious dispute.
The Court has regularly extended this same protection to the autonomy
of private religious schools. For example, in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago,81 teachers at two Catholic high schools filed petitions with the
National Labor Relations Board accusing the schools of unfair labor
practices. The schools moved to dismiss the petitions claiming that the
Establishment Clause precluded the Board from asserting jurisdiction. The
Court agreed, holding that “the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment foreclosed the Board’s jurisdiction.”82 The Court reasoned:

The Establishment Clause required the Court to interpret the Act to avoid “a
significant risk that the First Amendment will be infringed.”84 The Court
78
79
81
82
83
84
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See id. at 443–44.
Id. at 445–47.
Id. at 449.
440 U.S. 490 (1979).
Id. at 496.
Id. at 502–03.
Id. at 502.
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The resolution of [the unfair labor] charges by the Board, in many
instances, will necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith of the
position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to
the school’s religious mission. It is not only the conclusions that may
be reached by the Board which may impinge on rights guaranteed by
the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to
findings and conclusions . . . . Inevitably the Board’s inquiry will
implicate sensitive issues that open the door to conflicts between
clergy-administrators and the Board, or conflicts with negotiators for
unions.83
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(2012).

Id. at 507.
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 701
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Id. at 700.
Id. at 701.
89
Id. at 709.
90
Id. at 706.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 710.
93
Hypothetically, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-4 (2015), bolsters a religious organization’s claim for an exemption from the federal income tax.
However, Bob Jones is a part of the body of religious liberty law that predates Employment Division v.
88
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said, “[W]e decline to construe the Act in a manner that could in turn call
upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the
guarantees of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.”85
Most recently, the Court unanimously held that the Establishment
Clause barred it from considering a claim brought under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) by a former employee against a private
Lutheran elementary school.86 Cheryl Perich worked at the school teaching
a variety of subjects, including math, language arts, social studies, science,
gym, art, music, and religion. She became ill with narcolepsy and could no
longer teach. The school placed Perich on disability and then eventually
asked her to resign when it appeared she “was unlikely to be physically
capable of returning to work.”87 Perich became upset and refused to resign.
Instead of resolving the dispute peaceably, Perich threatened to sue under
the ADA. The school subsequently fired her because “her threat to sue the
[school] violated the Synod’s belief that Christians should resolve their
disputes internally.”88 Perich subsequently made good on her threat and
sued the school under the ADA.
The Court refused to hear Perich’s claim. “[T]he First Amendment
requires dismissal of this employment discrimination suit against her
religious employer.”89 Applying the ADA to the school, said the Court,
“intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision.”90 The First
Amendment “protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and
mission through its appointments.”91 For the Court to second guess the
school’s decisions in this case would trench on that right. Separation of
church and state, said the Court, “bars such a suit.”92
Thus, the Establishment Clause not only forecloses the government
from affirmatively supporting religion, but, more pertinently, shuts the
government out of religious matters. The government cannot tread into the
realm reserved for religion. It is precisely this concern that is raised by the
threat of stripping religious schools of their tax-exempt status.93
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C. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Religious Tax Exemptions
A review of the relevant Supreme Court cases shows that the Court’s
treatment of religious tax exemptions has been, at best, erratic. But one
constant runs through all the cases. The Court has always tied the
constitutionality of religious tax exemptions to concerns about separation of
church and state. That constancy suggests that such exemptions are an
acknowledgement of the autonomy of religious organizations rather than a
subsidy of religion.
1. A Survey of the Relevant Supreme Court Cases

The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or
suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of this
religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the
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Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), that Congress intended for RFRA to “restore.” As such, it is not clear that
RFRA adds anything to the discussion.
94
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
95
321 U.S. 573 (1944).
96
Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106–07.
97
17 U.S. 316 (1819).
98
Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113.
99
Id.
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A review of the pertinent cases starts with Murdock v. Pennsylvania94
and Follett v. Town of McCormick.95 The most interesting feature of
Murdock and Follett is that the tax exemptions in those cases were created
by the Court itself, based on an understanding of the imperatives of the First
Amendment. The Court recognized the exemptions as being constitutionally
compelled rather than being within the discretion of the legislature.
Both Murdock and Follett involved municipal ordinances imposing a
licensing tax on persons selling goods and merchandise in the community.
In both cases, the cities taxed the Jehovah’s Witnesses for going “door to
door . . . distributing literature and soliciting people to purchase certain
religious books and pamphlets, all published by the Watch Tower Bible &
Tract Society.”96
The Murdock Court held that the First Amendment required an
exemption for the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ canvassing activities. Echoing the
language of McCulloch v. Maryland,97 the Court said that allowing the City
of Jeannette to tax religious exercise would have a “destructive effect.”98
“The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms,” said
the Court, “is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court
has repeatedly struck down.”99 The Court went on:
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resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the
privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close
its doors to all those who do not have a full purse.100
Even though the city’s licensing tax contained no exemption for religious
organizations, the First Amendment mandated that one being given.
A year later, Follett confirmed the constitutional necessity of tax
exemptions for religious organizations. The Court again concluded that the
First Amendment required exemption from a municipality’s flat licensing
tax for the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious solicitors.
The exaction of a tax as a condition to the exercise of the great liberties
guaranteed by the First Amendments is as obnoxious as the imposition
of a censorship or a previous restraint. For, to repeat, “the power to tax
the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its
enjoyment.”101

100
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Id. at 112 (citations omitted).
Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944) (quoting Murdock, 319 U.S. at
112) (citations omitted).
102
Id. at 579 (Murphy, J., concurring).
103
Id. at 577.
104
Id. at 578.
101
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Justice Murphy drove home the need for religious tax exemptions in his
concurrence. “It is wise to remember,” he said, “that the taxing and
licensing power is a dangerous and potent weapon which, in the hands of
unscrupulous or bigoted men, could be used to suppress freedoms and
destroy religion unless it is kept within appropriate bounds.”102
The Follett Court rejected the characterization of a tax exemption for
the Jehovah’s Witnesses as a subsidy. “This does not mean that religious
undertakings must be subsidized,” said the Court.103 Rather, our holding is a
recognition that religious organizations cannot “be required to pay a tax for
the exercise of that which the First Amendment has made a high
constitutional privilege.”104
The lion’s share of the Supreme Court’s consideration of religious tax
exemptions after Murdock and Follett addressed whether such exemptions
were permissible under the Establishment Clause, not whether the
exemptions were in fact required by the Constitution. The cases arose when
taxpayers sued, arguing that a state’s provision of tax exemptions to
religious institutions ran afoul of the Establishment Clause by
impermissibly endorsing religion. Nonetheless, the cases bear directly on
our question of whether such religious tax exemptions are a subsidy or a
constitutionally compelled recognition of the autonomy of religious
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institutions.
The Court again grounded the constitutionality of religious tax
exemptions in separation concerns in Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of
New York.105 In Walz, an owner of real property in Richmond County, New
York sued the New York City Tax Commission arguing that “granting
property tax exemptions to religious organizations for religious properties
used solely for religious worship” violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.106 The Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the
exemption.
Writing for the Walz majority, Chief Justice Burger explained that the
goal of religious tax exemptions is “to avoid excessive entanglement”107 of
government and religious institutions, thereby “prevent[ing] the kind of
involvement that would tip the balance toward government control of
churches or governmental restraint on religious practice.”108 The New York
property tax exemption, said Burger, springs from a constitutionally-based
concern with “the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies.”109 Such
bodies “should not be inhibited in their activities by property taxation or the
hazard of loss of those properties for nonpayment of taxes.”110

Despite the Walz Court’s forceful language about church, state separation, it
did not hold that religious tax exemptions were constitutionally required, as
it had in Murdock and Follett. Rather, the Court held that the New York tax
exemption was a constitutionally “permissible state accommodation” of
105
106
108
109
110
111
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397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Id. at 666.
Id. at 670.
Id. at 669–70.
Id. at 672.
Id.
Id. at 673–74, 676.
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Grants of exemption historically reflect the concern of authors of
constitutions and statutes as to the latent dangers inherent in the
imposition of property taxes; exemption constitutes a reasonable and
balanced attempt to guard against those dangers . . . . Elimination of
exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by
giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax
foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in
the train of those legal processes . . . . The exemption creates only a
minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less
than taxation of churches. It restricts the fiscal relationship between
church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the desired
separation insulating each from the other.111
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religious institutions.112 The First Amendment permits states to exempt
religious institutions, but it does not require it.
Noteworthy for our purposes, the Court refused to categorize religious
tax exemptions as government subsidies. A “subsidy would be a
relationship pregnant with involvement and, as with most governmental
grant programs, could encompass sustained and detailed administrative
relationships for enforcement of statutory or administrative standards, but
that is not this case.”113 New York did not exempt religious organizations
from property taxes to further its own program of social welfare, i.e.,
religious organizations provide a “public benefit” that the state
“considers . . . as beneficial and stabilizing influence[s] in community
life.”114 Instead, New York “is simply sparing the exercise of religion from
the burden of property taxation levied on private profit institutions.”115
Paulsen explains:
Walz expressly disclaimed a “public benefit” theory for justifying tax
exemption of religious organizations. The rationale upon which the
Court upheld the New York statute in Walz was that tax-exemption
seeks to protect free exercise, foster diversity, and minimize
governmental interference.116
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Id. at 673.
Id. at 675 (emphasis added).
114
Id. at 673.
115
Id.
116
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection
Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 363–64 (1986).
117
Walz, 397 U.S. at 690 (Brennan, J., concurring).
118
489 U.S. 1 (1989).
113
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Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, is more direct. He pushes aside “those
who . . . argue that exemptions are the equivalent of governmental subsidy
of churches . . . . Tax exemptions and general subsidies, however, are
qualitatively different.”117
Walz, thus, dismisses the idea that religious tax exemptions are a
government subsidy. Though the case does not require religious tax
exemptions, it solidly roots the constitutionality of such exemptions in
concerns about the autonomy of religious institutions.
The Court reached a seemingly opposite result in Texas Monthly v.
Bullock.118 The case involved a Texas sales tax statute that applied to all
publications except “[p]eriodicals that are published or distributed by a
religious faith and that consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching
of the faith and books that consist wholly of writings sacred to a religious

37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 57 Side A

04/28/2016 10:11:02

06 - TRACEY_FINAL_4.25.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Bob Jonesing

4/25/16 8:52 PM

107

faith.”119 The narrow statutory exemption aimed squarely at religious
publications. Texas Monthly, a secular magazine publisher, challenged the
religious tax exemption as violative of the Establishment Clause. A
plurality of the Court agreed. But even in striking the exemption down, the
plurality expressed worry over “enmesh[ing] the operations of church and
state.”120 Not just that the Texas may be impermissibly favoring religion,
but that the state may be meddling with religious institutions in a way that
treads on their autonomy.
The plurality said that Texas’ sales tax exemption “lacks sufficient
breadth to pass scrutiny under the Establishment Clause.”121 Such a narrow
exemption inevitably entangles the state in religion. The exemption, the
plurality said:
appears, on its face, to produce greater state entanglement with religion
than the denial of an exemption. As Justice Stevens has noted: “There
exists an overriding interest in keeping the government—whether it be
the legislature or the courts—out of the business of evaluating the
relative merits of differing religious claims. The risk that governmental
approval of some and disapproval of others will be perceived as
favoring one religion over another is an important risk the
Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.” The prospect of
inconsistent treatment and government embroilment in controversies
over religious doctrine seems especially baleful where, as in the case
of Texas’ sales tax exemption, a statute requires that public officials
determine whether some message or activity is consistent with “the
teaching of the faith.”122
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Id. at 5 (citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at 21.
121
Id. at 14.
122
Id. at 20 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)) (citations omitted). In raising these concerns, the Court cited to the line of cases where it
recognized the Establishment Clause’s protection of religious autonomy—cases like Jones v. Wolf, 443
U.S. 595 (1979), Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), and
Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440 (1969).
123
See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 13.
124
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 666–67 (1970).
120
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The plurality discussed and cited approvingly Justice Harlan’s
concurrence from Walz.123 The tax exemption in Walz applied to “real or
personal property used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable
purposes,” not just religious purposes.124 Justice Harlan linked the breadth
of the exemption in Walz with entanglement concerns, concluding that there
is less entanglement danger when a tax exemption is broad.
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In the instant case noninvolvement is further assured by the neutrality
and breadth of the exemption. In the context of an exemption so
sweeping as the one before us here its administration need not entangle
government in difficult classifications of what is or is not religious, for
any organization—although not religious in a customary sense—would
qualify under the pervasive rubric of a group dedicated to the moral
and cultural improvement of men. Obviously the more discriminating
and complicated the basis of classification for an exemption—even a
neutral one—the greater the potential for state involvement in
evaluating the character of the organizations.125

126
127
128
129

Id. at 698–99 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14.
Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 836.
Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 6.
Id. at 21.
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In other words, the religious tax exemption in Walz furthered church,
state separation by avoiding entangling the State of New York in the affairs
of religious institutions. Whereas the religious tax exemption in Texas
Monthly did just the opposite. It was so narrowly drawn that it necessarily
required the State of Texas to troll through religious publications to
determine whether or not they in fact “promulgat[ed] the teaching of the
faith.”126 It increased church, state entanglement rather than minimized it.
The plurality, throughout its opinion, labeled Texas’ tax exemption as
a “subsidy.” But it is, as Professor Zelinsky has observed, “invoked in a
reflexive fashion.”127 Of course, in a colloquial sense, religious tax
exemptions provide “pecuniary aid” to religious organizations. That does
not mean the plurality believed that Texas’ exemption was a “subsidy” in
the technical, legal sense. Texas did not provide the exemption because it
viewed the religious periodicals as promoting the state’s own program or
message. Rather, as the lower court found, Texas passed the exemption
with the “purpose of preserving separation between church and state.”128
The plurality disagreed that the exemption accomplished this purpose but it
did not dispute that it was the state’s objective.
Moreover, if the plurality truly believed Texas’ exemption was a
subsidy, then that should have been the end of the case. It flatly violates the
Establishment Clause for the government to subsidize a religious
organization for the purpose of sending a religious message. The very fact
that the Court did not treat the case as open-and-shut means it did not
believe Texas was paying religious publications to send the state’s own
message. Yes, the Court concluded that the exemption was a “blatant
endorsement of religion.”129 But it went on to consider the “degree of state
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Id. at 20 n.9.
463 U.S. 388 (1983).
Id. at 397 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 398 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 391 n.2.
Id. at 398–99.
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entanglement in religious affairs.”130 That would not have been necessary if
the exemption was a true subsidy.
So the Texas Monthly court continued to root the constitutionality of
tax exemptions in separation of church and state concerns. Specifically,
whether the exemption impermissibly entangled the government with
religious matters. The Court concluded that Texas’ narrow tax exemption
for religious publications resulted in forbidden entanglement. It required the
state to wade into whether magazines and books were sufficiently religious
to fall within the state’s tax exemption. The Court labeled the exemption as
a subsidy, but did so only reflexively. It did not in fact treat Texas’
exemption as a true subsidy.
The Court’s earlier decision in Mueller v. Allen131 contrasts with Texas
Monthly, showing that a broader tax help, that avoids meddling with the
autonomy of religious institutions, passes constitutional muster. In Mueller,
the Court sustained against First Amendment challenge a Minnesota income
tax deduction for parents’ expenses for their children’s elementary and
secondary educations. Unlike the narrow tax exemption the Court struck
down in Texas Monthly, Minnesota’s tax deduction covered “educational
expenses incurred by all parents, including those whose children attend[ed]
public schools and those whose children attend[ed] non-sectarian private
schools or sectarian private schools.”132 So it “permit[ted] all parents—
whether their children attend[ed] public school or private—to deduct their
children’s educational expenses.”133 For example, the deduction was
available if a parent living in one public school district paid tuition to send
her child to a public school in another district. Or if a public school parent
pays for “[c]ertain summer school tuition.”134 Expenses incurred by parents
sending their children to private religious school were also included, but
those expenses were only one small part of the program.
The breadth of Minnesota’s deduction differentiates it from Texas’
exemption. The Court said, “[A] program, like [Minnesota’s], that neutrally
provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens is not readily
subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.”135 The Court again
tied the constitutionality to entanglement concerns. The broad nature of the
deduction led the Court to adjudge, “[W]e have no difficulty in concluding
that the Minnesota statute does not ‘excessively entangle’ the state in
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Id. at 403.
Id.
See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2015).
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989).
See WHEATON COLLEGE, www.wheaton.edu (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
See WORLD VISION INT’L, www.worldvision.org (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
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religion.”136 Any decisions the state has to make about whether particular
expenses qualify for the deduction, the Court said, “do . . . not differ
substantially from making the types of decisions approved in earlier
opinions of this Court.”137 Minnesota had no need to sift through parental
expenses to see if the private schools where they were spending money
were religious enough to qualify for the deduction. The deduction applied
across the board to all educational expenses—whether incurred at religious
or nonreligious institutions.
The income tax exemption provided by the IRS to religious
organizations under Section 501(c)(3) falls firmly on the Mueller v. Allen
side of the line.138 Like Minnesota’s tax deduction, the 501(c)(3) exemption
is broadly defined. It applies to any “[c]orporations, and any community
chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition . . . , or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.”139
Section 501(c)(3), unlike the tax exemption in Texas Monthly, does not
direct a benefit “exclusively to religious organizations.”140 Rather, the
exemption applies to the complete spectrum of nonprofit corporations.
The breadth of the 501(c)(3) exemption means the IRS does not need
to scrutinize how religious an organization is for it to qualify for tax-exempt
status. Most religious organizations serve more than one purpose. For
instance, a private religious school, like Wheaton College in Illinois,141
operates both for a religious purpose and for an educational purpose.
Likewise, a Christian humanitarian aid organization, like World Vision
International,142 operates both for a religious purpose and for a charitable
purpose. In each instance, either purpose is sufficient to qualify the
religious organization for 501(c)(3) status. Just how religious these
organizations really are is not determinative of whether they meet the
criteria for tax-exempt status.
And even when the IRS does consider whether an organization has a
religious purpose, its inquiry is limited. The Internal Revenue Manual, the
internal protocols for IRS personnel, gives examination guidelines for
religious activities. The guidelines say, “Under the First Amendment, the
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INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, Part 4.76.6 (Oct. 24, 2014),
www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-076-006.html.
144
See 26 U.S.C. § 508(c) (2015).
145
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 2
(2015), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf.
146
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK 57 (2014), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/14databk.
pdf.
147
ROB REICH, LACY DORN & STEFANIE SUTTON, ANYTHING GOES: APPROVAL OF NONPROFIT
STATUS BY THE IRS, STANFORD UNIV. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AND CIV. SOC’Y 4 (2009),
http://pacscenter.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Anything-Goes-PACS-11-09.pdf.
148
Id.
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IRS can’t consider the content or sources of a doctrine alleged to constitute
a particular religion. The IRS also can’t evaluate the content of a doctrine
an organization claims is religious.”143 In other words, the IRS must give
deference to what the organization calls religious. It cannot stick its nose
into the religious organization’s operations and beliefs to sniff out if they
are religious enough to qualify for an exemption.
Moreover, the most likely organizations to apply for 501(c)(3) status
solely on the ground of having a religious purpose—meaning they do not
also fall under some other category like educational or charitable—are
churches. And churches are special. Most organizations seeking tax-exempt
status are required to apply to the IRS for an advance determination that
they meet the requirements of Section 501(c)(3). But churches do not.144 A
church may simply hold itself out as tax exempt and receive the benefits of
that status without applying for advance recognition from the IRS.145 So
there is no determination made by the IRS at all. That means there cannot
possibly be any entanglement with religion when it comes to churches and
tax-exempt status.
Even beyond religious organizations, applications for 501(c)(3) status
just generally receive little scrutiny from the IRS. During fiscal year 2014,
for example, the IRS disapproved only 67 applications out of the 100,032
total 501(c)(3) applications submitted.146 A report from the Stanford
University Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society concluded, “Nearly
every application on which a decision is rendered is approved.”147 “It is
hardly an exaggeration,” said the report, “to say that when it comes to
oversight of the application process to become a public charity, nearly
anything goes.”148 Whatever allegations can be made about the process of
religious organizations applying for 501(c)(3), it is certainly not that the
process impermissibly entangles the IRS with religion. The process, if
anything, furthers the separation concerns that drive the recognition of a
religious tax exemption in the first place.
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At first blush, the Supreme Court’s follow up to Texas Monthly—the
decision in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization149—
appears to undermine the argument that the IRS is constitutionally
compelled to exempt religious organizations from income taxation. In the
case, Jimmy Swaggart Ministries sold religious merchandise in California
and claimed a constitutional right to a sales tax exemption. A unanimous
Supreme Court rejected this claim. “The Free Exercise Clause,” said the
Court, “does not require the State to grant appellant an exemption from its
generally applicable sales and use tax.”150 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries could
avoid any alleged burden on its free exercise rights simply by not selling
cups, books, tapes, and other swag in the State of California.
Swaggart is thus a limited opinion. It involved the imposition of
unrelated business income tax on the sale of merchandise by a religious
organization. The Court explained, “[I]t is a tax on the privilege of making
retail sales of tangible personal property and on the storage, use, or other
consumption of tangible personal property in California.”151 Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries fell under California’s sales and use tax because it sold
merchandise in the state, not just because it operated in the state. It was not
the religious services, the preaching, or the hymn singing that California
taxed. It was the side business of selling merchandise. Like anyone else
selling things in the state, Jimmy Swaggart Ministries had to pay a tax on
these sales.
This fact makes California’s sales and use tax distinct from something
like the federal income tax under consideration in this article. A religious
organization falls under an income tax merely by existing and carrying on
its operations. Like any other organization or business, religious
organizations need revenue to survive. For religious organizations, revenue
typically comes from donations, tithes, and grants. To the extent this
revenue exceeds the organization’s expenses—the money spent on items
like wages, office supplies, janitorial services, and toilet paper—the
organization has income. God willing, every religious organization has
income or else it will not last long. In a for-profit business, that difference
between revenue and expenses represents taxable income. The for-profit
business must pay federal corporate income tax at rate of fifteen to thirtynine percent depending on exactly how much taxable income it has. And,
but for the existence of religious tax exemptions at the federal and state
levels, religious organizations would have taxable income too. So a
religious organization can avoid a sales and use tax, but, absent some type
493 U.S. 378 (1990).
Id. at 392 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 389–90 (emphasis added).
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of exemption, not an income tax.
Just as significantly, a sales tax and an income tax differ as to the
centrality of the activity they tax. A sales and use tax is aimed at a
secondary part of a religious organization’s enterprise—selling swag, food,
or other items. Those sales are subsidiary to the organization’s primary
activity of ministering. As the Swaggart Court said, “[T]he collection and
payment of the generally applicable [sales] tax in this case imposes no
constitutionally significant burden on appellant’s religious practices or
beliefs.”152 In contrast, an income tax is aimed at the heart of what religious
organizations do. It taxes religious organizations simply for existing and
engaging in religious activities. The Swaggart Court recognized this kind of
tax “might effectively choke off an adherent’s religious practices.”153
California itself recognizes these distinctions. It imposes a sales and
use tax on religious organizations because the state understands this does
not raise “[t]he sorts of government entanglement that [the Supreme Court
Justices] have found to violate the Establishment Clause.”154 Such a tax is
not, as the Court said, “invasive.”155 Religious organizations can just choose
not to sell things in the state. But California still maintains income tax
exemptions for religious and educational organizations because an income
tax is “invasive.”156 A church or other religious organization is subject to
the tax simply by existing and ministering within the state’s borders. An
income tax cannot be avoided. It opens the possibility of the state taxing a
religious organization out of existence.
The Court in Swaggart, just as it did in the prior religious tax
exemption cases, considered whether the California sales tax resulted in
“administrative entanglement.”157 The Court concluded that it did not.

152
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Id. at 392.
Id.
Id. at 395–96.
Id. at 396.
See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23701d (West 2015).
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 394.
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Most significantly, the imposition of the sales and use tax without an
exemption for appellant does not require the State to inquire into the
religious content of the items sold or the religious motivation for
selling or purchasing the items, because the materials are subject to the
tax regardless of content or motive. From the State’s point of view, the
critical question is not whether the materials are religious, but whether
there is a sale or a use, a question which involves only a secular
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determination.158
The sales and use tax applied to all commerce in the state, whether religious
or nonreligious. The kind of narrow, religion-specific exemption that
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries requested would have ensnared the state in
religion just like the religious tax exemption in Texas Monthly.
2. The Ramifications of the Supreme Court’s Case Law
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Id. at 396.
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113 (1943).
160
Follett v. City of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 579 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring).
161
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
162
Id.
163
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 24 (1989).
164
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399. (1983).
165
Id. at 399–400 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796 (1973))
(quotations and citations omitted).
159
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So what should we make of the Court’s seemingly erratic treatment of
religious tax exemptions? At bottom, that whatever the apparent
discrepancies, the Court has a steadfast concern for the protection of
religious autonomy. At least four observations can be made.
First, the Court has consistently recognized that taxing religious
organizations is fraught with constitutional hazards. Way back in Murdock,
the Court cautioned about the “destructive effect” of allowing the
government to tax religion.159 In Follett, the Court said, “[T]he taxing and
licensing power is a dangerous and potent weapon which, in the hands of
unscrupulous or bigoted men, could be used to suppress freedoms and
destroy religion unless it is kept within appropriate bounds.”160 In Walz, the
Court warned of the “latent dangers inherent in the imposition of property
taxes” on religious organizations.161 It said that a religious tax exemption
“constitute[d] a reasonable and balanced attempt to guard against those
dangers.”162 In Texas Monthly, the Court noted that taxing religious
organizations poses a “danger of stamping out missionary work” and risks
becoming “a covert attempt to curtail religious activity.”163 In Mueller, the
Court said that the relationship between taxes, tax benefits, and religious
organizations raises “evils against which the Establishment Clause was
designed to protect.”164 “[G]overnment involvement in religious life,” said
the Court, “is apt to lead to strife.”165 The persistent drumbeat of the Court
has been that taxing religious organizations jeopardizes their
constitutionally protected autonomy.
Second, the constitutionality of religious tax exemptions hinges on
their impact on the autonomy of religious organizations. The First
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Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943).
Walz, 397 U.S. at 672.
Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 20 n.9.
Id. at 20 nn.9 & 21.
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403.
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 397 (1990).
Id. at 396.
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Amendment compelled an exemption for the Jehovah’s Witnesses from the
flat taxes in Murdock and Follett because the taxes acted as a “restraint on
the free exercise of religion.”166 The religious exemption from New York’s
property tax in Walz was constitutional because it served to accommodate
“the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies.”167 The narrow religious
exemption from the sales tax in Texas Monthly was unconstitutional
because of “the degree of state entanglement in religious affairs.”168 It
required state officials “to subject the content of religious publications
to . . . exacting scrutiny” in a way that “enmesh[ed] the operations of church
and state.”169 The tax deduction in Mueller was upheld because it did “not
‘excessively entangle’ the State in religion.”170 Nothing in the statute
required state to intrude on the affairs of private religious schools. Taxing
the ancillary merchandise sales of religious organizations raised no
Establishment Clause problems in Jimmy Swaggart because the Court
found “no excessive entanglement between government and religion.”171
The state stayed out of the business religious organizations—it was “not
require[d] . . . to inquire into the religious content of the items sold or the
religious motivation for selling or purchasing the items.”172 In each of these
cases, the root of what made the tax exemptions constitutional or
unconstitutional was the repercussions on the self-rule of religious
organizations.
Third, whether a tax impermissibly encroaches on the autonomy of
religious organizations depends on what activity the government chooses to
tax. When the government taxes a collateral part of what religious
organizations do, like the sale of t-shirts, stickers, and mugs as in Jimmy
Swaggart, it does not raise the same concerns about religious autonomy as
when the government taxes religious organizations’ central operations and
ministry, like the tax on the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ “missionary evangelism”
in Murdock.
In Murdock, the city’s flat tax transgressed the separation of church
and state because the tax fell squarely on the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious
activity—their door-to-door evangelism. The Court specifically rejected the
characterization of such evangelism as “merely incidental and collateral to
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their main object” as a religious organization.173 Rather, the Court deemed
the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ canvassing to be core religious exercise.
The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of
missionary evangelism—as old as the history of printing presses. It has
been a potent force in various religious movements down through the
years. This form of evangelism is utilized today on a large scale by
various religious sects whose colporteurs carry the Gospel to
thousands upon thousands of homes and seek through personal
visitations to win adherents to their faith. It is more than preaching; it
is more than distribution of religious literature. It is a combination of
both. Its purpose is as evangelical as the revival meeting. This form of
religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First
Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the
pulpits. It has the same claim to protection as the more orthodox and
conventional exercises of religion.174
Allowing the city to tax the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ door-to-door evangelism
threatened to shut their religious exercise down altogether.

That stands in contrast to the sales tax in Jimmy Swaggart. California’s
tax in that case fell “on the privilege of making retail sales of tangible
personal property.”176 Unlike the city’s tax on the Jehovah’s Witness doorto-door evangelism in Murdock, California taxed the ministry’s sale of
merchandise, not its religious activities. “[T]he sales and use tax,” the Court
said, “is not a tax on the right to disseminate religious information, ideas, or
beliefs.”177
California taxed only an ancillary part of Jimmy Swaggart’s
activities—the selling of items like “t-shirts with JSM logo, mugs, bowls,

174
175
176
177

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111–12 (1943).
Id. at 108–09.
Id. at 112.
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 389–90.
Id. at 389.
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Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its
exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its
maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form
of missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not
have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and
honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. Those who can
deprive religious groups of their colporteurs can take from them a part
of the vital power of the press which has survived from the
Reformation.175
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Id. at 383.
Id. at 378–79.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 392 (quotations omitted).
Id.
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 690–91 (1970).
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 6 (1989).
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plates, replicas of crown of thorns, ark of the covenant, Roman coin,
candlesticks, Bible stand, pen and pencil sets, prints of religious scenes, bud
vase, and communion cups.”178 “There [was] no danger,” said the Court,
“that appellant’s religious activity [was] being singled out for special and
burdensome treatment.”179 The “tax merely decrease[d] the amount of
money appellant ha[d] to spend.”180
The Court specifically distinguished the flat tax imposed on the
Jehovah’s Witnesses in Murdock. “[T]he burden of a flat tax could render
itinerant evangelism crushed and closed out by the sheer weight of the toll
or tribute which is exacted town by town.”181 “But,” said the Court, “we
face no such situation in this case.”182 Any intrusion on religious autonomy
affected by the sales and use tax was minimal at best. So a tax imposed on a
collateral part of a religious organization’s undertakings does not raise the
same concerns regarding church, state separation as a tax aimed at its
necessary day-to-day operations.
Fourth, and finally, the Court has often used the “subsidy” label in a
conclusory fashion, giving no real consideration to whether the government
is doling out tax exemptions to religious organizations for the purpose of
advancing its own message and agenda. Recall that initially, the Court in
Murdock, Follett, and Walz eschewed the “subsidy” label altogether. “Tax
exemptions and general subsidies . . . are qualitatively different . . . . Tax
exemptions, accordingly, constitute mere passive state involvement with
religion and not the affirmative involvement characteristic of outright
governmental subsidy.”183 Things changed in Texas Monthly. The Court
deemed Texas’ sales tax exemption for religious publications a “subsidy.”
Yet the Court readily acknowledged that the state had the “purpose of
preserving separation between church and state,” and not a purpose of
furthering its own favored message.184 The exemption, thus, could not be
said to meet the technical definition of a subsidy.
The upshot is that the religious tax exemption in Section 501(c)(3)
seems much more likely to be about protecting the autonomy of religious
organizations than giving them a subsidy. The federal income tax has peak
potential for a “destructive effect” on religious organizations. Religious
organizations, like any business, depend on income as their lifeblood.
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Earning income is part and parcel of their everyday operations. Religious
organizations obviously cannot avoid earning money if they are to have any
longevity. Were the federal government given a free hand to tax the income
of the religious organizations, it could tax them out of existence. It is hard
to conceive of a greater intrusion on religious autonomy.
A. Tax Policy Supports Treating Religious Tax Exemptions as
Constitutionally Required Rather than as Subsidies
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185
See Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971,
994 (1999).
186
See Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural
Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168–71 (1993).
187
See id.
188
See Walz, 397 U.S. at 666–67.
189
See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5–7.
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The Court’s tendency to characterize religious tax exemptions as
subsidies is rooted in what is called tax expenditure analysis. The central
premise of this analysis is that tax provisions fall into one of two categories:
one, normative provisions, which define the base of the tax; or two,
expenditure provisions, which deviate from the base in a manner equivalent
to direct government expenditures.185 A normative provision defines the tax
base by spelling out the assets or income streams subject to taxation.186 The
tax base of a property tax, for instance, is a list of the real property—
whether commercial, residential, or industrial—subject to the tax. An
expenditure provision is any deviation from the defined tax base.187 So any
deduction, exclusion, or exemption is a deviation from the base and
therefore a tax expenditure, meaning it is the equivalent of a subsidy from
the public fisc. It is as if the government made the decision to spend money
directly in favor of whatever entity is the beneficiary of the deduction,
exclusion, or exemption.
Consider Walz again. The base of the New York tax could be
characterized as all real property in the state. The exemption of religious
properties was a deviation from that base.188 So, under tax expenditure
analysis, the exemption would be an expenditure—a decision by the state to
subsidize religious organization. Or consider Texas Monthly. The base of
the Texas tax was the sale of any periodical in the state. The exemption of
religious periodicals was a deviation from that base.189 So, using tax
expenditure analysis, the exemption was an expenditure—it constituted a
subsidy of religious organizations publishing religious periodicals.
The rub with tax expenditure analysis is that it provides no rule of
thumb for when to classify a particular tax provision as normative or as an
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See Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 809–10.
Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1291 (1969).
See Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 579 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring).
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expenditure. When is the government defining the base of a tax and when is
it deviating from that base to subsidize a particular entity? Nothing compels
the classification of a tax provision as one or the other. Yet that
classification is essential for knowing when it is fair to treat a deduction,
exclusion, or exemption as a government subsidy as opposed to merely
defining the contours of a tax.190
With Walz, the religious tax exemption could just as easily be
classified as normative as it could be as an expenditure. The base of the
New York property tax could be viewed as “personal residences and
business property.”191 The exemption for religious or charitable properties
then would be part of defining the tax base rather than an expenditure. If
religious properties are not part of the base to begin with, then their
exemption from the tax is not a deviation. And thus, under tax expenditure
analysis, the exemption is not an expenditure and cannot be called a
subsidy.
The Court has reflexively classified many religious tax exemptions as
expenditure provisions. But nothing in tax expenditure analysis compels
this conclusion. In fact, the Court’s knee-jerk reaction to religious tax
exemptions ignores the reality that much tax exemption is best understood
as base defining. Take for example my own state of Florida. Florida is
financed largely by a six percent sales tax. The state imposes no personal
income tax. It is not compelling to characterize the state’s failure to tax
personal income as a “subsidy” of citizen’s income. Rather, the state’s
taxing power excludes personal income as a matter of tax base selection.
The same can be said of religious tax exemptions. In Murdock and
Follett, Justice Murphy noted that it was unconvincing to consider the
Court’s exemption of the Jehovah’s Witnesses from the city’s licensing tax
as a subsidy, since the city could not tax them without running afoul of the
First Amendment.192 If the Constitution mandates the exclusion of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses from the tax base to begin with, it is not a “subsidy” to
refrain from taxing them. Rather, it is the implementation of a
constitutionally-required tax base.
As pointed out above, the Court’s concern about church and state
separation has permeated its consideration of religious tax exemptions. That
concern suggests that exemptions for religious organizations are normative
rather than expenditures. The government is defining its tax base in
recognition of the autonomy of religious organizations. It is not making a
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McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
Id. at 317.
195
See id. at 428.
196
The Supreme Court itself classified a tax credit for tuition dollars spent at private religious
schools as normative in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2010). In
Winn, the Court dismissed on standing grounds a taxpayer challenge under the Establishment Clause to a
tax credit given for individuals who contributed money to a student tuition organization that in turn
provided scholarships for students to attend private schools, including religious ones. The taxpayer
plaintiffs argued that the tax credit was akin to a subsidy or governmental expenditure, which the
taxpayers would have standing to challenge under the Establishment Clause. The Court disagreed,
explaining that there is a difference between when the government spends money and “[w]hen the
government declines to impose a tax.” Id. The credit was part of defining the base of the tax rather than
an expenditure.
194
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decision to subsidize their message or mission.
McCulloch v. Maryland193 provides a parallel. The State of Maryland
“impose[d] a tax on all banks or branches thereof, in the state of Maryland,
not chartered by the legislature.”194 The state’s tax base seemingly included
the bank established by the federal government, since it was not chartered
by the state legislature. As such, the Court’s decision that the Constitution
required the exemption of the federal bank from the tax could be viewed as
a subsidy. The exemption was a deviation from the defined tax base. But
that’s not how the Court viewed its decision. Rather, the Court saw it as the
implementation of a constitutionally required tax base. Federalism—the
very structure of government established by the Constitution—placed the
federal bank outside of Maryland’s tax power.195 The state could not
include the bank within its tax base to begin with, so the exemption of the
federal bank could not be considered a subsidy.
The religious exemption from the federal income tax is similar. Much
like federalism placed the federal bank beyond the taxing power of the State
of Maryland, the Establishment Clause—and the ensuing concerns about
religious autonomy—places religious organizations beyond the federal
government’s power to tax. The religious exemption in Section 501(c)(3)
implements the constitutionally required tax base. It does not constitute an
expenditure or subsidy in favor of religion.196
The Court cannot blithely label a religious tax exemption as a
subsidy—a deviation from the tax base—unless there is agreement as to
normative tax base to begin with. Nothing in tax expenditure analysis
mandates that a religious tax exemption be denominated an expenditure
provision rather than a normative provision. The Court’s consistent concern
for religious autonomy suggests religious tax exemptions are a proper
acknowledgement of the sovereignty of religious institutions. As such,
religious tax exemptions are not subsidies, because they implement, rather
than deviate from, the normative tax base.
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Constitutional Necessity
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Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 839.
See Bill of Rights FAQs, NAT’L CONST. CTR., http://constitutioncenter.org/media/files/BORfaqs.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
199
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 682 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
200
Id.
201
The Supreme Court has repeatedly said, “The Commonwealth’s efforts to separate church
and state provided the direct antecedents of the First Amendment.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 437 (1961); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 33–38 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
202
See A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RELIGION IN AMERICA TO 1877, at 58 (Edwin S. Gaustad
& Mark A. Noll eds., 3d ed. 2003).
203
Walz, 397 U.S. at 683 (Brennan, J., concurring).
204
Carl H. Esbeck, Protestant Dissent and the Virginia Disestablishment, 1776–1786, 7 GEO. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 88 (2009).
198
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Treating religious tax exemptions as constitutionally required explains
the thoughts and actions of the founding generation. As Professor Zelinsky
has aptly said, “Much ink has been spilled addressing the apparent paradox
that the founding generation proclaimed the separation of church and state
while simultaneously confirming and extending tax exemption for
churches.”197 The states ratified the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, along with the rest of the Bill of Rights, in 1791.198 “Religious
tax exemptions were not an issue in the petitions calling for the Bill of
Rights, in the pertinent congressional debates, or in the debates preceding
ratification by the states.”199 Yet that was not because they did not exist or
could not be foreseen. In fact, religious tax exemptions “were widespread
during colonial days.”200 Rather, it is more likely that the founders simply
viewed religious tax exemptions as consistent with separation. Or, more
strongly put, that such exemptions actually furthered separation rather than
contradicted it.
The Commonwealth of Virginia’s story is illustrative of how the
founders viewed the interplay of religious tax exemptions and church, state
separation.201 Virginia established the Anglican Church as the state church
in 1619.202 And it continued as the state church until 1799, when the
Virginia General Assembly passed the Act to Repeal Certain Acts, and to
Declare the Construction of the Bill of Rights and Constitution, Concerning
Religion.203 Although Thomas Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom from 1786 is often celebrated as the end to Virginia’s official state
church, the bill “did not expressly disestablish the Anglican Church (or its
successor the Protestant Episcopal Church).”204 “The church could, under
the letter of [Jefferson’s bill], continue to enjoy the imprimatur of the state
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Id.
Id.
207
See Michael V. Hernandez, A Flawed Foundation: Christianity’s Loss of Preeminent
Influence on American Law, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 657–58 (2004).
208
Walz, 397 U.S. at 683 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting 2 Va. Statutes at Large of 1792–
1806 (Shepherd) 149).
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
206
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(just not its financial support), as well as the state’s preferential
treatment.”205 The government could even continue to have a “hand in
clerical appointments or the regulation of the liturgy.”206 It was not until
thirteen years later, in 1799, that the Commonwealth officially
disestablished the Anglican Church.207
The 1799 Act affirmed that the Virginia Bill of Rights had “excepted
from the powers given to the government, the power of reviving any species
of ecclesiastical or church government . . . by referring the subject of
religion to conscience.”208 And going directly to disestablishment, the Act
pronounced that the repealed measures that had “bestowed property upon
the [Anglican Church],” had “asserted a legislative right to establish any
religious sect,” and had “incorporated religious sects,” were “inconsistent
with the principles of the constitution, and of religious freedom, and
manifestly tends to the reestablishment of a national church.”209 Yet just
one year after the passage of this Act, Virginia re-enacted a measure
exempting from taxation property belonging to “any . . . college, houses for
divine worship, or seminary of learning.”210 This exemption dated at least
from 1777 and had been reaffirmed immediately before and after
ratification of the First Amendment.211 Virginians, thus, did not view the
exemption for “houses of divine worship” as somehow re-establishing
religion. Religious tax exemption and separation could at least co-exist.
The best explanation of this tension between the founding generation
simultaneously propounding separationism and religious exemptions is that
they thought of exemptions as furthering church, state separation. It is only
when religious tax exemptions are thought of as subsidies that the founding
generation’s actions seem illogical. How could they have pushed for the
disestablishment of churches and at the same time pushed for the
government to subsidize them? They could not and, in fact, did not. Their
actions show that they understood religious exemptions as a proper
recognition of religious autonomy and therefore, compatible with the
separation of church and state.
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III. THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE OF BOB JONES UNIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES
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Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983).
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 1919, 1924 (2006).
214
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 603–04.
215
See id. at 604 n.29.
216
Id. (emphasis in original).
217
Id. at 603–04.
218
Id. at 604.
219
Id. at 604 n.29.
220
Id.
213
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The Supreme Court in Bob Jones treated the religious exemption in
Section 501(c)(3) as being constitutionally compelled, rather than as a
matter of government subsidy. Had the Bob Jones Court believed the
exemption was a subsidy, then the Court need not have considered whether
the “IRS construction of § 170 and § 501(c)(3) violate[d] [the schools’] free
exercise rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.”212 As
Professor Eugene Volokh has observed, “The government need not
subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights.”213 A subsidy is a matter of
government largess. If the IRS determines that subsidizing racially
discriminatory private schools is contrary to the policies it seeks to
promote, then it can simply choose no longer to subsidize those schools.
But that is not what the Court did. The Court acknowledged that the
“[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact on the
operation of private religious schools.”214 It carefully set churches and other
religious institutions to one side, recognizing the heightened concerns about
religious autonomy.215 “We deal here only with religious schools —not with
churches or other purely religious institutions.”216 Instead, the Court held
that the government’s interest in eradicating race discrimination in
education was “so compelling as to . . . substantially outweigh[] whatever
burden denial of tax benefits places on [the schools’] exercise of their
religious beliefs.”217 According to the Court, “The interests [in religious
autonomy] asserted by petitioners [Bob Jones University and Goldsboro
Christian Schools] cannot be accommodated with that compelling
governmental interest.”218
It was the government’s unique and compelling “interest . . . in
denying public support to racial discrimination in education” that justified
the intrusion on religious autonomy.219 “[R]acially discriminatory schools
exert a pervasive influence on the entire educational process,” said the
Court, “outweighing any public benefit that they might otherwise
provide.”220 The Court has recognized no similar interest when it comes to
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private religious schools adhering to the view that marriage is the union of
one man and one woman.
A. The Run Up to Bob Jones
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Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Johnson, supra note 36, at 4.
Id.
Id.
See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2015).
Id.
See Johnson, supra note 36, at 4.
See id. at 4–5.
Id.
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The controversy in Bob Jones is rooted in the efforts of civil rights
groups to curb the growth of racially discriminatory private schools. The
U.S. Supreme Court declared racial segregation in public schools to be
unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education221 in 1954. In the
aftermath of Brown, thousands of white children in the South fled the newly
integrated public schools.222 They sought refuge in private schools where
they could continue to receive a segregated education. “In some
communities, the white student body,” according to Professor Olatunde
Johnson, “moved en masse to a new private school, taking the indicia of the
old schools, such as the school colors, symbols, and mascots.”223 Many
Southern state governments even encouraged the creation of these
segregated, private schools by “enacting legislation mandating or allowing
the closing of public schools to resist desegregation or providing state tax
credits and tuition grants to students attending private schools.”224
Ten years after Brown, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1964.225 Title VI of the Act specifically prohibited racial segregation and
discrimination in schools that received “federal financial assistance.”226
Congress premised Title VI on the belief that federal dollars should not
subsidize segregation in public schools.227 But rather than putting an end to
the segregated education that dominated the South, Title VI resulted in even
greater growth of private, segregated schools.228 One hundred and sixtyeight private schools opened in Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana,
North Carolina, and South Carolina between 1964 and 1967. Most were
openly segregationist and operated by secular organizations. White citizens’
councils, for instance, operated more than 150 all-white “segregation
academies” in the South, serving more than 9,000 students.229
As time went by, more and more of these segregated, private schools
were opened by Evangelical Christian churches. Indeed, by 1970, Christian
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private schools outnumbered the secular schools.230 Many claimed that
“Christian schools and segregation academies [were] almost
synonymous.”231
When Congress passed Title VI, the Internal Revenue Service put a
freeze on “applications for tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the [Internal
Revenue] Code filed by private schools apparently found to be operated on
a segregated basis.”232 The freeze was supposed to give the IRS time to
consider whether tax exemptions qualified as “federal financial assistance”
under Title VI. The freeze lasted two years. At the conclusion, the IRS
issued a revenue ruling determining that private, segregated schools could
only be denied tax-exempt status where “[s]tate action for constitutional
purposes” was found.233 Because government assistance—whether tax
exemptions or otherwise—does not generally convert private action into
“state action,” the revenue ruling effectively shielded the schools from
losing their tax exemptions.234 Indeed, the very same day the IRS issued its
ruling, it approved tax-exempt status for more than forty segregated, private
schools.235
The IRS’s ruling did not sit well with civil rights groups. The Lawyers
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (LCCR) orchestrated a lawsuit,
ultimately known as Green v. Connally, “to enjoin the Secretary of the
Treasury from granting tax-exempt status to private schools in Mississippi
which discriminate[d] against Negroes in admissions.”236 LCCR argued that
the IRS’s ruling violated constitutional and statutory prohibitions on
government aid to racially discriminatory organizations.237 A three-judge
district court agreed and preliminarily enjoined the IRS “from issuing
Id.
Joseph Crespino, Civil Rights and the Religious Right, in RIGHTWARD BOUND: MAKING
AMERICA CONSERVATIVE IN THE 1970S 96 (Bruce Schulman & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2008).
232
Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C. 1970).
233
The IRS’s ruling provided as follows:
231
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The Service stated that its general conclusion is that exemption will be denied and contributions
will not be deductible if the operation of the school is on a segregated basis and its involvement
with the state or political subdivision is such as to make the operation unconstitutional or a
violation of the laws of the United States.
Where, however, the school is private and does not have such degree of involvement with the
political subdivision as has been determined by the courts to constitute State action for
constitutional purposes, rulings will be issued holding the school exempt and the contributions to it
deductible assuming that all other requirements of the statute are met.
Press Release, Internal Revenue Service (Aug. 2, 1967), 1967 CCH STANDARD FED. TAX REP. ¶ 6734.
234
See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982).
235
See Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. at 1131.
236
Id. at 1129.
237
See id. at 1129–30.

37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 66 Side A

230

37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 66 Side B

04/28/2016 10:11:02

06 - TRACEY_FINAL_4.25.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

126

FIU Law Review

4/25/16 8:52 PM

[Vol. 11:85

238

C M
Y K

04/28/2016 10:11:02

Id. at 1131.
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 578 (1983) (quoting I.R.S. News Release
(July 10, 1970), reprinted in 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 6,790).
240
Id.
241
See id.
242
See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1179 (D.D.C. 1971), aff’d sub nom. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
243
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 578; see also Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1155.
244
See Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1164.
245
See Coit, 404 U.S. at 997.
246
See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971–2 C.B. 230.
247
See id.
239
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further ruling letters under sections 170(c) and 501(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code to private schools in Mississippi.” 238
In response to the ruling, the IRS concluded that it could “no longer
legally justify allowing tax-exempt status [under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code] to private schools which practice racial discrimination.”239
At the same time, the IRS announced that it would no longer “treat gifts to
such schools as charitable deductions for income tax purposes [under §
170].”240 A few months later, the IRS formally notified private schools of
its change in policy.241
The Green court eventually issued its opinion on the merits, approving
the IRS’s new construction of its code.242 The three-judge district court held
that “racially discriminatory private schools were not entitled to exemption
under § 501(c)(3) and that donors were not entitled to deductions for
contributions to such schools under § 170.”243 The court reasoned that
segregated private schools were not “charitable” within the meaning of the
law because they operated contrary to federal public policy against racial
discrimination. The court, thus, permanently enjoined the Commissioner of
the Internal Revenue from approving tax-exempt status for any school in
Mississippi that did not publicly maintain a policy of nondiscrimination.244
A group of parents supporting tax exemptions for segregated schools
appealed the case directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court summarily
affirmed the district court’s decision.245
A few months later, the IRS issued a revenue ruling formalizing its
new policy on the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private
schools.246 Private schools that discriminated on the basis of admission in
the administration of educational and other school-administered programs
could not be considered charitable within the meaning of sections 501(c)(3)
or 170(a).247 Both provisions incorporated common-law notions that
charitable trusts could not be illegal or contrary to public policy. While
private discrimination in schools was not illegal, “federal policy against
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racial discrimination is well-settled,” as
pronouncements such as Brown and Title VI.248
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B. The IRS Denies Tax-Exempt Status to Bob Jones University and
Goldsboro Christian Schools
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Id.
See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574, 581–82 (1983).
See id. at 604 n.30.
See id. at 579–84.
See id. at 591–92, 602–04.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 591.
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Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools were among
the private schools the IRS notified following the preliminary injunction in
Green v. Kennedy that their racially discriminatory practices jeopardized
their tax-exempt status.249 Goldsboro flatly denied admission to black
students, while Bob Jones admitted black students but prohibited interracial
dating and marriage. Both schools genuinely believed that the Bible forbade
“racial intermixing.”250 When the schools failed to comply with the IRS’s
demands, the IRS revoked their tax-exempt status.
That presented a problem for the schools. Being tax exempt under
Section 501(c)(3) allowed the schools to avoid federal income taxation,
meaning the difference between their revenues, like donations and tuition,
and their expenses, like wages and maintenance costs, were not treated as
taxable income. Now the schools had to pay tax on this income. Moreover,
donors to Bob Jones and Goldsboro could no longer deduct donations to the
schools from their taxes. That obviously made donating to the schools less
attractive.251 The schools sued in federal court, advancing two primary
arguments: first, the IRS exceeded its authority when it interpreted Section
501(c)(3) to exclude racially discriminatory schools and, second, the
revocation of tax exemption intruded on their religious autonomy protected
by the religious clauses of the First Amendment.252
The Court was not sympathetic to either of the schools’ arguments.
The IRS’s interpretation of Section 501(c)(3), and its subsequent
application to the schools, comported with historic notions of what
constituted a charity. The Court found that “§ 170 and § 501(c)(3)
embrace[d] the common law ‘charity’ concept.”253 That concept, according
to the Court, included “the requirement, long recognized in the law of
trusts, that the purpose of a charitable trust may not be illegal or violate
established public policy.”254 One such “established public policy” in the
United States was “that racial discrimination in education violates deeply
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and widely accepted views of elementary justice.”255 “Over the past quarter
of a century, every pronouncement of this Court and myriad Acts of
Congress and Executive Orders,” said the Court, “attest a firm national
policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination in public
education.”256 Were the IRS to give tax-exempt status to Bob Jones and
Goldsboro, it would plainly run afoul of this well established public policy.
“It would be wholly incompatible with the concepts underlying tax
exemption,” said the Court, “to grant the benefit of tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory educational entities.”257
The Court acknowledged that the denial of the schools’ tax-exempt
status had a “substantial impact” on their religious autonomy, but said that
the government “may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing
that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.”258
“[T]he Government,” said the Court, “has a fundamental, overriding interest
in eradicating racial discrimination in education.”259 Whatever the intrusion
on the schools’ religious autonomy, it was “substantially outweigh[ed]” by
the government’s interest in rooting out race discrimination in education.260
The Court, thus, upheld the denial of tax-exempt status to both schools.
C. The Limited Reach of the Court’s Decision
In reaching its conclusion in Bob Jones, the Court acknowledged the
sensitivity with which public policy matters are imbued.

The Court underscored the limited circumstances in which the IRS and the
courts may even consider the effect of public policy. “We emphasize,” said
the Court, “that these sensitive determinations should be made only where
there is no doubt that the organization’s activities violate fundamental

255
256
258
259
260
261
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Id. at 592.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 603–04 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1982)).
Id. at 604.
Id.
Id. at 592.
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We are bound to approach these questions with full awareness that
determinations of public benefit and public policy are sensitive matters
with serious implications for the institutions affected; a declaration that
a given institution is not “charitable” should be made only where there
can be no doubt that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamental
public policy.261
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Id. at 598.
Id. at 596 n.21.
264
Id. at 604 n.29.
265
Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns
Against Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 103, 109
(Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008).
266
See Jerry Rex Buckles, Reforming the Public Policy Doctrine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 397, 403
(2005) (“Judicial decisions following Bob Jones add little to the doctrine espoused by the Supreme
Court. Few decisions have done more than mention the public policy doctrine in passing.”).
267
83 T.C. 381 (1984), aff’d, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987).
268
Id. at 503.
269
Id. at 505.
270
579 F. Supp. 967 (1984), aff’d, 820 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
263
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public policy.”262 The Court expressly left open “whether an organization
providing a public benefit and otherwise meeting the requirements of §
501(c)(3) could nevertheless be denied tax-exempt status if certain of its
activities violated a law or public policy.”263
The Bob Jones Court itself limited its ruling to “religious schools” and
only when “the governmental interest is in denying public support to racial
discrimination in education.”264 It is not at all clear that the Court intended
to create a free-floating public policy doctrine, whereby the IRS can deny
tax-exempt status anytime it determines an organization’s actions or beliefs
violate public policy. Professor Douglas Kmiec points out, “[T]here have
been very few true extensions of the Bob Jones public policy limitation
outside the racial discrimination context.”265
Only a handful of court decisions have done more than mention the
public policy limitation from Bob Jones in passing.266 Of those, only two
merit comment. First, in Church of Scientology v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,267 the United States Tax Court upheld the IRS’s revocation of
income tax exemption of the Church of Scientology. But the organization’s
activities were clearly illegal. The Church “impede[d] the IRS in
performing its duty to determine and collect taxes from petitioner and other
Scientology churches.”268 The activities alleged were egregious—
”petitioner filed false tax returns, burglarized IRS offices, stole IRS
documents, and harassed, delayed, and obstructed IRS agents who tried to
audit the Church’s records.”269
Second, in Synanon Church v. United States,270 a federal district court
in the District of Columbia ruled that Synanon failed to establish
entitlement to exemption under Section 501(c)(3). Synanon was allegedly
founded to rehabilitate drug addicts and to engage in related research and
public education. However, the organization regularly “advocate[d] terror
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Id. at 971.
Id.
Id. at 974.
Id. at 979.
I.R.S. Gen. Counsel Mem. 39,792, at 5 (June 30, 1989), 1989 WL 592760, at *1.
See id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-10-001 (Nov. 30, 1988).
Id.
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and violence.”271 The district court found “repeated attacks and threats of
violence committed by Synanon members against those perceived as
enemies of the organization.”272 But the court ultimately based its denial of
the tax exemption on the organization’s “systematic destruction of tapes
and alteration of records . . . contemporaneous with an IRS audit.”273
Despite Synanon’s illegal behavior, the court declined to rely on the public
policy doctrine from Bob Jones as the basis for decision. The court said, “[It
was] concerned with the proper application of the Bob Jones analysis if it
could be said that Synanon conferred some arguable public benefit—drug
rehabilitation, for example—while simultaneously maintaining a policy of
violence and terror.”274
Outside the courts, Bob Jones has been administratively extended to
include racial discrimination in any 501(c)(3) context. For instance, the IRS
considered a tax exemption for a charitable trust that provided “for the
benefit and relief of worth and deserving white persons.”275 The trust
furnished goods and services to needy, Caucasian citizens over the age of
sixty.276 The IRS said that the Bob Jones decision “leaves little doubt” that
racial discrimination, “whether in an educational context or otherwise,”
violates public policy in such a fundamental way as to justify revocation of
an entity’s tax-exempt status.277 The trust’s racially restrictive provision,
according to the IRS, “foster[ed] racial discrimination” and, therefore, was
contrary to “clearly defined federal public policy against racial
discrimination.”278
In a private letter ruling in 1988, the IRS likewise said, “Although
applying on its face only to race discrimination in education, the
implication of the Bob Jones decision extends to any organization claiming
exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) and to activity violating a clear
public policy.”279 The letter ruling concerned a privately administered trust
that restricted beneficiaries to “worthy and deserving white persons.”280 The
IRS held that the trust did not qualify for tax exemption under Section
501(c)(3) since it “aggravate[d] the burdens placed on those who have
traditionally been the subject of discrimination and thereby fosters racial
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See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,800 (Oct. 25, 1989), 1989 WL 592766.
284
Kmiec, supra note 265, at 109.
285
Id.
286
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,800, at 10 (Oct. 25, 1989), 1989 WL 592766, at *4.
287
Internal Revenue Service, Field Service Advice Memorandum, 1997 FSA LEXIS 478, at *11
(Apr. 23, 1997).
288
Buckles, supra note 266, at 398.
289
Johnson, supra note 36, at 29; see also James A. Davids, Enforcing a Traditional Moral
Code Does Not Trigger a Religious Institution’s Loss of Tax Exemption, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 435
(2012) (“[A]fter reviewing the context of the Bob Jones case . . . it is little wonder [that] neither the
Internal Revenue Service . . . nor the Supreme Court has extended the sanction beyond private
educational institutions that discriminate on the basis of race.”).
290
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
291
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
282
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discrimination.”281 Consequently, the trust’s activities were “contrary to a
clearly defined public policy” against racial discrimination.282
But the IRS has refused to push Bob Jones beyond the topic of race.
For example, when a support program for teaching the literature and history
of the Bible was challenged as violating the Establishment Clause,283 the
IRS determined that “the objection was without merit.”284 It cautioned
against “finding Bob Jones like violations of public policy premised on
other individual rights.”285 The IRS noted that it could “think of no more
fundamental federal public policy than the Bill of Rights.”286 More recently,
the IRS refused to revoke an exemption on public policy grounds for an
over accumulation of income. The IRS commented that “[c]urrently the sole
basis for revocation of exemption on public policy grounds is engaging in
racial discrimination.”287
The reluctance of the courts and the IRS to expand Bob Jones beyond
racial discrimination makes sense. Professor Johnny Rex Buckles has
rightly said that an expansion of “[t]he public policy doctrine presents a
thorny array of other concerns,”288 including most basically: what defines
the contours of public policy; what makes public policy fundamental; what
role, if any, does state law play in defining public policy; and how many
acts would demonstrate a disregard of public policy? These questions have
no clear answers.
All these considerations point to what Professor Olatunde Johnson
observed about Bob Jones. The case is “too extraordinary to matter
much.”289 It sits alongside Supreme Court cases like Brown v. Board of
Education290 and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,291 where the
Court undertook extraordinary measures to remedy the evil of race
discrimination. The cases are important victories for civil rights but they do
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not establish broad rules that can be applied outside the context of
eradicating racism. In short, Bob Jones and its ilk are, as Professor Michael
Paulsen has said, “sui generis.”292
IV. BOB JONES DOES NOT JUSTIFY STRIPPING RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
OF THEIR TAX-EXEMPT STATUS BECAUSE OF THEIR VIEWS ON MARRIAGE
The Bob Jones Court recognized the importance of protecting the
autonomy of religious organizations but ruled that the government’s interest
in eradicating race discrimination in education was so “fundamental” and
“overriding” to justify abrogating the wall between church and state.293
When it comes to same-sex marriage, there is no similarly “fundamental”
and “overriding” interest that warrants ignoring the protections for religion
provided by the Establishment Clause.
The “fundamental” and “overriding” interest in Bob Jones was specific
as to education.294 Nine times the majority emphasized that “racial
discrimination in education violates a fundamental public policy.”295 The
federal government’s condemnation of racial discrimination in education
“was unmistakably clear.”296 “Over the past quarter of a century, every
pronouncement of this Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive
Orders,” said the Court, “attest a firm national policy to prohibit racial
292

Paulsen, supra note 42, at 694.
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
294
Id. (“[T]he Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial
discrimination in education.”) (emphasis added).
295
Id. at 594 (emphasis added); see also id. at 579 (“Based on the national policy to discourage
racial discrimination in education, the IRS ruled that a private school not having a racially
nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not ‘charitable’ within the common law concepts reflected in
sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code.”) (emphasis added); id. at 582 (Bob Jones University’s “racial
policies violated the clearly defined public policy, rooted in our Constitution, condemning racial
discrimination and, more specifically, the government policy against subsidizing racial discrimination
in education, public or private.”) (emphasis added); id. at 592 (“But there can no longer be any doubt
that racial discrimination in education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary
justice.”) (emphasis added); id. at 593 (“An unbroken line of cases following Brown v. Board of
Education establishes beyond doubt this Court’s view that racial discrimination in education violates a
most fundamental national public policy, as well as rights of individuals.”) (emphasis added); id. at 595
(“Whatever may be the rationale for such private schools’ policies, and however sincere the rationale
may be, racial discrimination in education is contrary to public policy.”) (emphasis added); id. at 604
(“the Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in
education”) (emphasis added); id. at 584 n.23 (“if any national policy is sufficiently fundamental to
constitute such an overriding limitation on the availability of tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), it is
the policy against racial discrimination in education”) (emphasis added); id. at 604 n.29 (“We deal here
only with religious schools—not with churches or other purely religious institutions; here, the
governmental interest is in denying public support to racial discrimination in education.”) (emphasis
added).
296
Id. at 598.
293
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Id. at 593.
See William M. Wiecek & Judy L. Hamilton, Beyond the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
Confronting Structural Racism in the Workplace, 74 LA. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (2014) (discussing “the
comprehensive racial regime that we know as segregation or Jim Crow, which lasted from the end of
Reconstruction in 1877 until it began to crumble in the Second Reconstruction after 1954”).
299
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
300
See WHEATON COLLEGE, www.wheaton.edu (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
301
See BIOLA UNIVERSITY, www.biola.edu (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
302
See Schwartz, supra note 43.
303
See CAMPUS PRIDE, www.campuspride.org (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
304
Schwartz, supra note 43; see also Shafrir, supra note 43.
305
See Jaschik, supra note 43.
306
See Lamb, supra note 43.
298
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segregation and discrimination in public education.”297 No similar
unanimity exists within the three branches of the federal government with
regard to sexual orientation discrimination in education.
The educational context of Bob Jones shows that the private religious
schools arose, particularly in the South, as a way to avoid desegregation.
Jim Crow laws formalized school segregation in 1877.298 That segregation
continued until 1954 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board
of Education,299 which mandated racially-integrated schools. Brown put an
end to the formal, legal segregation that had lasted 77 years. In response, as
explained above, a slew of private religious schools cropped up as an end
run of racial integration. Many of these private schools had state support. In
Bob Jones, the Supreme Court closed the loophole. It finally put the kibosh
on attempts to dodge the racial integration required by Brown.
Gays and lesbians have faced no similar history of discrimination in
education. Private religious schools, like Wheaton College300 and Biola
University,301 did not spring up to provide avenues for students to avoid
gays and lesbians. Indeed, the educational environment for gays and
lesbians is mostly favorable. Many colleges and universities undertake
“special recruiting efforts for gay students.”302 Organizations, like Campus
Pride, hold college fairs across the country catering to gays and lesbians.303
“Ivy League schools are often represented” at these fairs, according to the
New York Times.304 Schools like Duke University and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology specifically ask applicants about sexual orientation
on their admissions application.305 University officials refer to gays as “the
new blue-chip recruits.”306 That hardly seems the kind of treatment calling
for the extraordinary measures employed by the Court in Bob Jones.
No laws have been passed barring schools from discriminating on the
basis of sexual orientation. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
does not prohibit “harassment or discrimination based upon sexual
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Tyrrell v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 792 F. Supp. 2d 601, 622-23 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
Emma Margolin, Transgender Students Protected Under Title IX, DOE Says, MSNBC (Apr.
30, 2014, 4:09 PM), www.msnbc.com/msnbc/transgender-students-protected-under-title-ix.
309
See Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40245 (Aug. 2, 1995); Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63
Fed. Reg. 30097 (May 28, 1998); Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42971 (July 21, 2014).
310
See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Employ
ment_Non-Discrimination_Act#113th_Congress (last visited Sept. 9, 2015).
311
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015).
312
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983).
313
Id. at 592.
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orientation.”307 The U.S. Department of Education suggested last year that
perhaps “Title IX’s sex discrimination prohibition extends to claims of
discrimination based on gender identity or failure to conform to
stereotypical notions of masculinity or femininity.”308 But Congress has
taken no action to expand the reach of Title IX.
Outside the context of education, the federal government has still been
largely silent on sexual orientation discrimination. Presidents Clinton and
Obama signed executive orders prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination by the federal government and its contractors.309 But federal
law otherwise does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Congress
has yet to pass the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which
would ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment
nationwide. ENDA has been introduced in every Congress since 1994, but
has yet to pass both houses. The Senate, but not the House, passed a version
of ENDA in November 2013. The Senate included a broad exemption for
religious organizations, including private religious schools.310
Obergefell did nothing to change the calculus. The Obergefell court
largely rooted its decision in the fundamental right to marry. It
acknowledged that “the right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of
the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from
that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.”311 But it
did not hold that sexual orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification. Obergefell is strictly about marriage, not about prohibiting
discrimination more broadly against gays and lesbians.
The current state of federal law does not seem to provide the kind of
“fundamental” and “overriding” interest sufficient to set aside the
Constitution’s mandate of church, state separation. In Bob Jones, there was
a “firm national policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination in
public education.”312 The Court had no “doubt that racial discrimination in
education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary
justice.”313 The federal government had engaged in “consistent” efforts to
eliminate racial discrimination in education—even by military force. There
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is no counterpart with sexual orientation discrimination.314
Of course that could change. Just this past summer, the EEOC
interpreted Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to forbid sexual
orientation discrimination on the job as a form of “sex” discrimination.315
The EEOC’s views on the scope of Title VII are merely persuasive. Indeed,
no court is required to follow the agency. Nonetheless, the EEOC’s decision
points to a possible shift in federal nondiscrimination law. If, and when, that
shift occurs, the argument for a “fundamental” and “overriding” interest
perhaps becomes a bit easier. But until that day comes, the autonomy of
religious organizations, and the ensuing tax exemption under Section
501(c)(3), seem safe.
CONCLUSION
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See id. at 594.
See Complainant v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080 (July 16, 2015), www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/sexual_orientation/eeoc-lgbt-title-vii-decision.authchec
kdam.pdf.
316
James A. Davids, Enforcing a Traditional Moral Code Does Not Trigger a Religious
Institution’s Loss of Tax Exemption, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 435 (2012); see also id. at 455
(“[G]iven the extraordinary history and context of racial segregation in education, the likelihood of the
Court finding a similar compelling interest in areas other than racial discrimination is remote.”).
315
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The calls from scholars and commentators to strip private religious
schools of their tax-exempt status in the wake of Obergefell are off base.
These calls have uniformly assumed that a tax exemption is a government
subsidy. But when the federal government exempts religious organizations
from paying income tax, it is not choosing to back religion. Rather, the
government is recognizing that the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment mandates a separation of church and state. It imposes a
structural restraint that places religious organizations beyond the taxing
power of the federal government.
Bob Jones is an anomaly. Eradicating race discrimination in education
is the only public policy the Court has held so “fundamental” and
“overriding” to abrogate the autonomy of religious schools. The factual
context of Bob Jones is so unique and extraordinary that, as Professor
James Davids observed, “it is little wonder why neither the Internal
Revenue Service . . . nor the Supreme Court has extended the sanction
beyond private educational institutions that discriminate on the basis of
race.”316
No similar context exists for sexual orientation discrimination in
education. If anything, gays and lesbians are sought after and welcomed by
the most prestigious and powerful education institutions in the country.
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People of faith did not establish private religious schools to evade gays and
lesbians. The Establishment Clause protects the autonomy of these schools.
It precludes the government from being handed the power to tax them out
of existence. To paraphrase Professor Zelinksy, in the final analysis, tax
exemption does not subsidize these religious schools, it leaves them
alone.317

37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 71 Side B
04/28/2016 10:11:02

317

See Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 8.

C M
Y K

